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ISSUED BY A GRAND JURY
United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 722 (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In United States v. R. Enterprises I the United States Supreme
Court held that a subpoena duces tecum 2 issued by a grand jury is
presumed to be reasonable and that the recipient bears the burden
of proving unreasonableness. 3 The Court stressed the importance
of grand jury independence while making it more difficult for a re-
cipient to quash a subpoena.4 This Note explores the Court's opin-
ion and concludes that the Court correctly placed the burden of
proving unreasonableness on the subpoena recipient but inade-
quately defined the scope of the reasonableness standard.5 As a re-
sult lower courts may not know when to employ the Court's
standard of reasonableness. This Note attempts to clarify these am-
biguities by predicting how courts will apply and interpret the
Court's standard.6 This Note also questions the Court's reliance on
the independent investigatory nature of the grand jury in light of
recent changes in the grand jury system.7 Finally, this Note praises
Justice Stevens' standard for balancing both sides' interests while
considering how the grand jury presently operates.
8
1 111 S. Ct. 722 (1991).
2 A grand jury process compelling production of certain specific documents and
other items, material and relevant to the grand jury investigation, which documents and
items are in custody and control of person or body served with process. See FED. R.
GRIM. P. 17 (1990).
3 R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. at 728.
4 Id.
5 See infra text accompanying notes 146-147.
6 See infra text accompanying notes 148-149.
7 See infra text accompanying notes 150-162.
8 See infra text accompanying notes 163-164.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S HISTORICAL VIEW OF THE GRAND JURY'S
INVESTIGATIVE POWER
In a line of decisions dating back to 1906, the Supreme Court
consistently recognized that a grand jury enjoys broad investigatory
powers.9 The cases similarly stress the necessity of the grand jury's
independence from judicial intervention and extensive procedural
rules.10
Throughout the years, the Court has employed different stan-
dards to review a petition to quash a subpoena depending upon the
recipient's specific challenge to the subpoena." The Supreme
Court in Hale v. Henkel12 first recognized a reasonableness limitation
to overly broad grand jury subpoenas.' 3 An overly broad subpoena
lacks specificity in describing the requested materials. The resulting
burden on the subpoena recipient may violate the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection from unreasonable search and seizure. 14 The
Court employed a standard of "far too sweeping to be regarded as
reasonable" to review breadth challenges. 15 The Court rejected the
notion that a witness may not be questioned prior to the return of
an indictment.' 6 The Court reasoned that allowing the grand jury
to examine witnesses will aid them in determining whom to indict.17
In Hale the petitioner received a subpoena to testify and produce
business papers to a grandjury. 18 Petitioner argued, inter alia, that it
was physically impossible for him to get the requested materials to-
gether in the time allowed. 19 The Court determined that the re-
quest for business papers was not specific enough and thus,
unreasonable.
20
9 Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972);
United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19 (1973);
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
10 See supra note 9.
11 Id.
12 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
13 Id. at 65.
14 Id. at 76. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
15 Hale, 201 U.S. at 76.
16 Id. at 67-68.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 70.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 76-77. The subpoena lacked specificity because it requested
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In Branzburg v. Hayes21 the Court faced a First Amendment chal-
lenge to a subpoena which required newspersons to testify and di-
vulge confidential sources to a grandjury.22 The Court required the
Government to establish that the information sought in a grand jury
investigation related "directly" to the criminal conduct being inves-
tigated.23 The Court recognized that when a grand jury subpoena
infringes upon First Amendment interests, the government's bur-
den of proof increases.2 4 In the present case, the Court required
the government to show a direct link between the newsperson's tes-
timony about confidential sources and the investigation into drug
trafficking. 25 The Court upheld the subpoena, finding that eradicat-
ing illegal drug trafficking constituted a "compelling state interest"
and that the information pertaining to a drug transaction directly
related to the grand jury investigation. 26 In so finding the Court
stressed, "[i]t is only after the grand jury has examined the evidence
that a determination of whether the proceeding will result in an in-
dictment can be made."
27
In United States v. Dionisio28 the Court held that in general the
Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply to grand jury subpoenas. 29 Citing Hale, the
Court noted however, that the Fourth Amendment does, "provide
protection against a grand jury subpoena duces tecum too sweeping
in its terms 'to be regarded as reasonable.' "30 The Court rejected
the argument that the Fourth Amendment required the government
"all understandings, contracts or correspondence between the MacAndrews &
Forbes Company, and no less than six different companies, as well as all reports
made, and accounts rendered by such companies from the date of the organization
of the MacAndrews & Forbes Company, as well as all letters received by that com-
pany since its organization from more than a dozen different companies situated in
seven different states ..
Id.
21 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
22 Id. at 667. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and
to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
23 Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 708.
24 Id. at 700-701 (quoting Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee,
372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963)). The "compelling interest" rule is based upon a line of cases
that require official action with adverse impact on First Amendment rights be justified by
a "compelling" public interest. See id. at 680 n.18.
25 Branzburg, 408 U.S at 700-701.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 701-702.
28 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
29 Id. at 9. See supra note 14 for the text of the Fourth Amendment.
30 Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 11-12 (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906)).
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to make a preliminary showing of reasonableness. 3 ' Thus, the
Court ruled that the government need not make a preliminary show-
ing of reasonableness before a grand jury witness would be required
to furnish voice exemplars. 32 In United States v. Mara,3 3 a companion
case to Dionisio, the Court held that the Fourth Amendment's pro-
tection against unreasonable search and seizure does not protect a
recipient from an irrelevant grand jury subpoena.3 4 Therefore, the
government is not required to make a preliminary showing of rele-
vancy. 35 In reaching its decision in Dionisio, the Court reasoned that
"any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and pre-
liminary showings would assuredly impede its investigation and
frustrate the public's interest in the fair and expeditious administra-
tion of the criminal laws."
'3 6
In United States v. Calandra37 the Court held that the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule38 does not apply to grand jury pro-
ceedings.3 9 Respondent, subpoenaed to appear before a grand jury,
refused to testify about business records that federal agents seized
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 40 The Court rejected this
claim explaining that "[p]ermitting witnesses to invoke the exclu-
sionary rule before a grand jury would precipitate adjudication of
issues hitherto reserved for the trial on the merits and would delay
and disrupt grand jury proceedings. ' 4 ' The Court reasoned that
due to the grand jury's broad investigatory power, "its operation is
generally unrestrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary
rules governing the conduct of criminal trials."
42
In the previous cases the Court set standards for challenges to
31 Id. at 8 (In Dionisio the recipient argued that the Fourth Amendment protection
against unreasonable search and seizure required a preliminary showing of reasonable-
ness before a grand jury witness could be forced to furnish a voice exemplar).
32 Id.
33 410 U.S. 19 (1973).
34 Id. at 21 (in Mara the recipient contended that the government must make a pre-
liminary showing of reasonableness before a subpoena requiring the production of a
handwriting exemplar can be enforced).
35 Id. at 22.
36 Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 17.
37 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
38 This rule commands that where evidence has been obtained in violation of the
search and seizure protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment, see supra note 14,
the illegally obtained evidence cannot be used at the trial of the defendant.
39 Calandra, 414 U.S. at 351 (the Court distinguished the exclusionary rule as a rule
of evidence which does not apply to a grand jury subpoena, as opposed to a constitu-
tional provision which may apply).
40 Id. at 341.
41 Id. at 349.
42 Id. at 343.
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grand jury subpoenas. In United States v. Nixon,_43 however, the Gov-
ernment encountered a reasonableness objection to a trial sub-
poena. In Nixon, the Court required the Government to make a
preliminary showing of reasonableness. 44 The Court held that the
Government must show the relevancy, admissibility, and specificity
of the subpoenaed materials before a court will enforce a subpoena
duces tecum pursuant to Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.45 In the absence of such a showing the subpoena will be
considered "unreasonable or oppressive. ' '46 Nixon argued that due
to his executive privilege the subpoena failed to meet Rule 17(c)'s
reasonableness requirement.47 The Court found that the prosecu-
tor had made a sufficient showing to justify the subpoena.
48
B. STANDARDS EMPLOYED BY LOWER COURTS
1. Reasonableness Requirement
In determining whether a grand jury subpoena duces tecum is
reasonable pursuant to Dionisio,49 lower courts have used a three
component test:50
(1) the subpoena may command only the production of things rele-
vant to the investigation being pursued;
(2) specification of things tobe produced must be made with reason-
able particularity; and
(3) production of records covering only a reasonable period of time
may be required.
43 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
44 Id. at 700.
45 Id. at 699-700. Rule 17 (c) provides as follows:
For Production of Documentary Evidence and of Objects. A subpoena may also
command the person to whom it is directed to produce the books, papers, docu-
ments or other objects designated therein. The court on motion made promptly may quash
or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable or oppressive. The court may
direct that books, papers, documents or objects designated in the subpoena be pro-
duced before the court at a time prior to the trial or prior to the time they are to be
offered in evidence and may upon their production permit the books, papers, docu-
ments or objects or portions thereof to be inspected by the parties and their
attorneys.
(emphasis added) FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (c).
46 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 698. In Nixon, after the prosecution indicted certain staff mem-
bers and supporters of the President, the prosecutor subpoenaed under Rule 17(c), for
production at trial, certain tapes and documents relating to precisely identified conver-
sations between the President and others. Id. at 686.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 410 U.S. 1 (1973). See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
50 United States v. Gurule, 437 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1970), cert denied, Baker v. United
States, 403 U.S. 904 (1971). This test first appeared in In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces
Tecum (Provision Salesman), 203 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1961); see also, In re GrandJury
Subpoena Duces Tecum (M.G. Allen), 391 F. Supp. 991 (D.R.I. 1975).
19921 833
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To balance the effect of the three part test, courts give the Govern-
ment considerable deference on the relevancy issue because of the
grand jury's exploratory nature.51 Consequently, the Government
has been required to prove the elements of the following three-part
test in order to maintain its burden of proving relevancy. "1. That
there is a pending grand jury investigation; and 2. The general na-
ture of the subject matter of said grand jury investigation; and 3.
That some possible relationship exists between the subpoenaed
documents and the subject matter of said investigation.
' 52
This three part reasonableness test is distinct from the Nixon
test 55 in one important way. The Nixon test requires the Govern-
ment to show the admissibility of subpoenaed materials at trial. No
such requirement is found in the reasonableness standard for an
overly broad grand jury subpoena.
2. Relevancy Objections
The lower courts apply conflicting standards when reviewing
relevancy objections to grand jury subpoenas. The courts are also
in disagreement as to whether the Government or the subpoena re-
cipient bears the burden of proof. Some courts require a prelimi-
nary showing of relevancy by the government.54 Other courts place
a strong burden on the recipient to prove that the subpoenaed
materials are irrelevant. 55 Yet a third group of courts place a lesser
burden on the recipient.
56
In In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Battle)57 the Sixth Circuit held that
when a recipient challenges a grand jury subpoena on relevancy
51 Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956), cert denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956).
52 Allen, 391 F. Supp. at 998.
53 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
-54 In re GrandJury Proceedings (Schofield I), 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (Schofield II), 507 F.2d 963 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1015
(1975); In re GrandJury Matter (Gronowicz), 764 F.2d 983, 986 (3d Cir. 1985) (en banc)
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1055 (1986); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Issued on
June 9, 1982, 697 F.2d 277, 281 (10th Cir. 1983).
55 In re GrandJury Subpoena (Battle), 748 F.2d 327, 329 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, John Doe (Weiner), 754 F.2d 154, 155-156 (6th Cir. 1985); In re
Liberatore, 574 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served Upon Doe
(Roe), 781 F.2d 238, 248 (2d Cir. 1986) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1108 (1986); In re
GrandJury Subpoena Served Upon Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 867 (1973).
56 In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Scotia), 691 F.2d 1384 (11 th Cir.
1982) cert. denied, 642 U.S. 1119 (1983); In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield), 721
F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Hergenroeder), 555 F.2d 686
(9th Cir. 1977).
57 748 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1984).
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grounds, "the burden is on the party seeking to quash the subpoena
to show 'that the information sought bears no conceivable relevance
to any legitimate object of investigation by the federal grand
jury.' "58 Similarly, in In re Liberatore,59 the Second Circuit employed
the same "no conceivable relevance" standard to a grand jury sub-
poena recipient's relevancy objection.60 The court held that the
"[G]overnment does not in each and every case bear the constant
burden of initially showing the relevance of the particular evidence
sought to be produced by way of subpoena."
6 1
In contrast to the "no conceivable relevance" standard, the
Third and Tenth Circuits have required the Government to make a
preliminary showing of relevance. 62 In Schofield 163 the Third Circuit
held that the "Government [would] be required to make some pre-
liminary showing by affidavit that each item [sought] is at least rele-
vant to an investigation being conducted by the grand jury and
properly within its jurisdiction, and is not sought primarily for an-
other purpose."64 The Third Circuit has since softened the Govern-
ment's affidavit burden by only requiring the Government to show
that the documents requested are reasonably related to the subject
of the grand jury's investigation.
65
Forging a middle ground, the Eleventh and Ninth circuits do
not require a preliminary showing of relevance by the Government
and do not hold the recipient to the stringent "no conceivable rele-
vance" standard.66 In In re grand Jury Proceedings (Bank of Nova Sco-
tia)67 the Eleventh Circuit refused to require the Government to
show that the documents sought were relevant to the grand jury in-
vestigation, "absent some showing of harassment or prosecutorial
misuse of the system."
' 68
58 Id. at 330 (quoting In re Libertore, 574 F.2d at 83). The recipient, a former union
official, sought to quash a subpoena seeking all books, papers, records, and data relating
to certain discretionary bank accounts controlled by him. The court of appeals rejected
the official's contention that the Government should have the burden of demonstrating
the relevance of the requested materials.
59 574 F.2d 78 (2d Cir. 1978).
60 Id The recipient of a grand jury subpoena seeking handwriting exemplars con-
tended that the Government should be required to show relevance and necessity of the
information to the grand jury's investigation.
61 Id. at 83.
62 See supra note 54.
63 486 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1973).
64 Id. at 93.
65 See e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Harrisburg Grand Jury, 658 F.2d 211 (3d
Cir. 1981).
66 See supra note 56.
67 691 F.2d 1384 (11th Cir. 1982).
68 Id. at 1387.
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The Ninth Circuit, in In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Schofield) 69, also
refused to impose on the Government the burden to make a thresh-
old showing of relevance. In Schofield the grand jury issued a sub-
poena to the former attorney of a target, requesting documents
relating to the previous representation. The district court quashed
the subpoena explaining that the Government must first establish by
affidavit, the "legitimate need and relevance" of the requested
materials. 70 The court of appeals reversed, holding that "[n]o affi-
davit of relevance and need must be introduced" because the pre-
sumption is that the Government obeys the law.
7'
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1986, a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of
Virginia began investigating allegations of interstate transportation
of obscene materials. 72 In early 1988, the grand jury issued subpoe-
nas duces tecum to three New York companies owned in whole by
Martin Rothstein: Model Magazine Distributors, Inc. (Model), R.
Enterprises, Inc., and MFR Court Street Books, Inc. (MFR).
73
Model distributed sexually oriented paperback books, magazines,
and videotapes and R. Enterprises distributed adult materials.
74
MFR is an adult bookstore in New York City.7 5 The subpoenas
sought an assortment of corporate books and business records from
all three companies. 7 6 An additional subpoena sought copies of 193
identified videotapes that Model had shipped into the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia.
7 7
The parties78 moved to quash the subpoenas on grounds that
the subpoenas requested materials irrelevant to the grand jury's in-
vestigation and that enforcement of the subpoenas violated their
69 721 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1983).
70 Id. at 1222.
71 Id. at 1223.
72 United States v. R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. 722, 724 (1991).
73 Id. Model had been investigated for interstate transportation of obscene materials
when it was found to have shipped adult videotapes into the Eastern District of Virginia.
Even though there was no evidence that R. Enterprises or MFR had shipped obscene
materials into Virginia they were also owned by Martin Rothstein and also sold adult
materials from New York.
74 Id.




78 In the proceedings before the District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia
and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Model was also a party.
But on appeal to the Supreme Court, Model was not a party since the Government chose
only to challenge those subpoenas quashed by the Court of Appeals.
836 [Vol. 82
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First Amendment rights.7 9 The parties maintained that R. Enter-
prises and MFR sold only to local customers and never conducted
business in Virginia. 0 Therefore, their records were irrelevant to
an investigation pertaining to the shipment of obscene materials
into Virginia.
Additionally, the parties maintained that the burden on these
small companies to comply with the subpoenas would severely im-
pact the distribution of books in violation of the First Amendment.8 1
Even though corporate records and not magazines were subpoe-
naed, the First Amendment still afforded protection.8 2 Accordingly,
the parties argued that the Government must show a compelling
state need for the business records sought and that the records were
substantially related to the grand jury's investigation. 3 The peti-
tioner admitted that this heightened standard is limited to cases
where the challenged subpoena arguably violates the First Amend-
ment. The compelling interest standard leaves substantial discre-
tion with the district court to balance the competing interests of the
First Amendment and the Government's right to investigate poten-
tial crimes. The parties argued that because the subpoenaed materi-
als were irrelevant to the investigation, the interest of the First
Amendment greatly outweighed the Government's right to investi-
gate. Therefore, because the subpoenas violated the First Amend-
ment and were irrelevant to the investigation, they were
unreasonable under Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.8 4
The District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia denied
the petitioner's motion to quash the subpoenas.8 5 Additionally, the
district court held that production of the videotapes did not consti-
79 R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. at 725.
80 Brief for Respondents at 1, United States v. R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. 722 (1991)
(No. 89-1436). [hereinafter Brief for Respondents].
81 Id- at 1. Under the First Amendment the Government cannot investigate obscen-
ity charges in a manner that will impermissibly chill the exercise of free speech rights,
even if the same investigative strategies would be acceptable in other routine criminal
cases. See Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963).
82 Brief for Respondents, supra note 80, at 25. See also Star Distributors, Ltd. v. Ho-
gan, 337 F. Supp. 1362 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (in concluding that taking the corporate records
of magazine distributors with a search warrant constituted a prior restraint, the district
court reasoned that business records intertwined with First Amendment materials are
just as much protected by the First Amendment as books and videotapes themselves).
83 Brief for Respondents, supra note 80, at 17. The parties based this standard on
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); see supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
84 Brief for Respondents, supra note 80, at 17. See supra note 43 for the text of Rule
17 (c).
85 United States v. R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. 722, 725 (1991).
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tute a prior restraint.8 6 The district court found that because R. En-
terprises, MFR, and Model were owned by the same person, a
sufficient connection with Virginia existed to satisfy the subpoenas'
relevancy to the grand jury investigation. 87 In response to plaintiffs'
arguments that the Government needs to show a substantial relation
between the subpoenaed materials and the investigation, the district
court felt "inclined to agree" with "the majority of jurisdictions"8 8
which do not require the Government to make a "threshold show-
ing" before a grand jury subpoena will be enforced.8 9 In sum, the
district court characterized the subpoenas as "fairly standard busi-
ness subpoenas" that "ought to be complied with." 90 The district
court struck down the First Amendment issue by finding that busi-
ness records are not protected by the First Amendment.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit upheld the sub-
poena for Model's business records but remanded the motion to
quash the subpoena for Model's videotapes. 9 1 In addition, the court
of appeals overturned the district court's denial of the motion to
quash the business records subpoenas issued to R. Enterprises and
MFR. 92
The court of appeals applied the Nixon standard without expla-
nation. 93 Possibly, they may have reasoned that since the governing
rule for a subpoena duces tecum in both the grand jury and trial
context is found in Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 17(c), the
Nixon standard should be equally applicable to a grand jury sub-
poena. Following the Nixon standard the court of appeals required
the government to "clear three hurdles" before it enforced the
grand jury subpoenas: (1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; (3)
specificity. 94
The court of appeals found that the Government met its rele-
vancy burden of proof with Model's business records because of the
evidence that Model had shipped obscene materials into the Eastern
District of Virginia. 95 Because the Government did not know that
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id See supra notes 55-56.
89 R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. at 725.
90 Id.
91 In re Grand Jury 87-3 Subpoena Duces Tecum, 884 F.2d 772, 776-78 (4th Cir.
1989).
92 Id. at 777.
93 Id. at 776. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Nixon standard.
94 In re Grand Jury 87-3, 884 F.2d at 776. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying
text.
95 In re Grand Jury 87-3, 884 F.2d at 776.
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every videotape subpoenaed contained obscene materials, the court
of appeals remanded for the district court to determine in camera if
the videotapes contain obscene materials. 96 This precaution was
necessary because the First Amendment protects from being sub-
poenaed any videotape that is not obscene. The R. Enterprises and
MFR subpoenas failed to meet the Nixon standard that required the
material to be admissible at trial, because there was no evidence that
either company conducted business in the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia.97 The Government's argument that all three companies were
owned by the same person was not sufficient to meet the standard of
proof.98 The court of appeals did not rule on the First Amendment
issue because the subpoenas did not pass the standard for ordinary
subpoenaed materials as set out in Rule 17(c).
The United States appealed the decision quashing R. Enter-
prises' and MFR's subpoenas to the Supreme Court. The United
States argued that the court of appeals applied the wrong standard
for a grand jury subpoena and incorrectly placed the initial burden
of proof on the government.99 The Supreme Court granted certio-
rari because of the conflicting standards employed by the lower
courts to determine the reasonableness of a grand jury subpoena.
IV. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS
A. THE MAJORITY OPINION
Writing for the Court,100 Justice O'Connor reversed the deci-
sion of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for judgment
on the First Amendment issue.10' In so holding, the Court greatly
expanded the Grand Jury's subpoena power by placing the burden
of proof for relevancy objections on the recipient.' 0 2 Specifically,
the majority held that when a recipient challenges a grand jury sub-
poena on relevancy grounds, the recipient bears the burden of
showing "that there is no reasonable possibility that the category of
materials the Government seeks will produce information relevant
96 Id. at 778-79. The court of appeals suggested that the Government take an easier
route and buy the videotapes to check them for obscene scenes.
97 Id. at 776-77.
98 Id.
99 United States v. R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. 722, 725 (1991).
100 Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to
Parts I and II.
101 R. Entemrpes, 111 S. Ct. at 729.
102 It is unclear from the Court's opinion if this standard is applicable for every grand
jury subpoena challenged under Rule 17(c) or limited to those challenged on relevancy
grounds. See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text for further discussion.
1992] 839
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to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation."'10 3 Under
this standard the burden of proof lies solely with the subpoena re-
cipient and the Government is under no obligation to make a
threshold showing of relevance.104 In reaching its standard the
Court criticized the court of appeals' adoption of the Nixon standard
and held that the Nixon standard does not apply to grand jury sub-
poenas.' 0 5 Finally, the Court found that Respondents had not met
their burden of proof in showing that the subpoenaed business
records were irrelevant to the grand jury investigation.'
0 6
1. Application of Court's Standard to the Facts
Applying this standard to the case at bar, the Court required
the Respondents to show that there was "no reasonable possibility"
that their subpoenaed business records would produce "any rele-
vant information" to the grand jury's investigation into allegations
that obscene materials were shipped into the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia.'0 7 Respondents maintained that neither of their companies
had any connection with Virginia. 108 According to the Court, how-
ever, a blanket denial did not fulfill Respondent's burden of
proof.10 9 It was already known that Model had shipped obscene
materials into Virginia."10 Because Respondents conduct the same
business in the same area and are owned by the same person as
Model, there existed a reasonable possibility that the business
records were relevant. I I ' Therefore, the Court ruled that on its rel-
evancy challenge, the Respondents had not fulfilled their burden to
quash the subpoenas. 1
12
The Court did not consider the First Amendment issue in the
application of its standard to the facts of the case. According to the
Court, "[t]he Court of Appeals determined that the subpoenas did
not satisfy Rule 17(c) and thus did not pass on the First Amendment
issue. We express no view on this issue and leave it to be resolved
by the Court of Appeals.""
l 3
103 R. Enterprises, I11 S. Ct. at 728.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 726-27.










2. Rationale for Rejecting the Nixon Standard
The Court declined to extend the Nixon standard for reviewing
the reasonableness of a trial subpoena to a grand jury subpoena. 1 4
In Nixon"15 the Court found a trial subpoena was unreasonable
under Rule 17(c) if the prosecutor did not show the relevancy, ad-
missibility, and specificity of the subpoenaed materials to the
trial." 16 In addition, Nixon placed the standard of proof on the gov-
ernment to show that the subpoena is reasonable."17 In rejecting
the Nixon standard, two propositions were made. First, the nature of
a grand jury investigation is unique and distinct from that of a crimi-
nal trial.1 Second, restrictions such as the Nixon standard, that
would delay a grand jury investigation, are not applicable." 9
In support of the first proposition, the Court emphasized that
the grand jury operates in a distinct fashion from a trial court. 20
First, while a court is limited to a specific case and charge, a grand
jury "can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being vio-
lated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not."1 21 Fur-
thermore, in performing the necessary function of gathering all
information that might possibly concern the investigation, a grand
jury must paint with a broad brush. A grand jury needs to investi-
gate every clue to determine whether a crime has been commit-
ted. 22 Finally, at a criminal trial the specific offense and defendant
are known at the outset, while in a grand jury investigation, if there
be an offense and defendant, they are not developed until the inves-
tigation's conclusion. 2 3
Turning to the second proposition, the Court stressed that re-
strictions which apply to a trial do not apply to a grand jury investi-
gation. For instance, evidentiary restrictions which lead to accurate
findings at a criminal trial, do not apply to a grand jury investiga-
tion, primarily to guard against delay. In Costello v. United States ' 24
114 Id. at 727.
"15 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
116 Id. at 700. See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text.
117 Nixon, 418 U.S. at 700.
118 R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. at 726.
119 Id.
120 Id.
121 Id. (quoting United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-643 (1950)) (in
Morton the Court was ruling on an order of the Federal Trade Commission when they
compared the FTC's power to that of a grand jury in contrast to a court's power).
122 Id. See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 701 (1972) (in Branzburg the Court
required newspersons to testify before a grand jury regarding confidential sources); see
supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
123 R. Enterprises, 11 S. Ct. at 726.
124 350 U.S. 359 (1956), reh. denied, 351 U.S. 904 (1956) (petitioner, convicted of in-
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the Court refused to apply the rule against hearsay to a grand jury
investigation. The Court stated probable delay in the grand jury
process as a rationale for their decision. 125 In addition, the Court
held in United States v. Calandra 126 that the Fourth Amendment ex-
clusionary rule did not apply to grand jury proceedings: "A grand
jury 'may compel the production of evidence or testimony of wit-
nesses as it considers appropriate, and its operation generally is un-
restrained by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules
governing the conduct of criminal trials.' "127
In furtherance of its contention that the Nixon standards were
not appropriate for a grand jury, the Court cited to its statement in
United States v. Dionisio, 128 that, "[a]ny holding that would saddle a
grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings would assuredly
impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest in the fair
and expeditious administration of the criminal laws."' 29 Therefore,
because the Nixon standard "would invite procedural delays and de-
tours while courts evaluate the relevancy and admissibility of docu-
ments sought by a particular subpoena,"' 13 0 it is inapplicable in the
grand jury context.
3. New Rule 17(c) Reasonableness Standard for Grand Jury Subpoenas
With respect to future cases, the Court clarified the standard to
evaluate reasonableness under Rule 17(c) and where to place the
burden, thus resolving the split in the circuits. 131 First, because the
Court presumed a grand jury acts within its scope of authority, the
Court placed the burden of showing unreasonableness on the sub-
poena recipient. 13 2 Second, the Court concluded that when a recipi-
ent challenges a subpoena on relevancy grounds, 33 "the motion to
come tax evasion, contended that his indictment by the grand jury relied on hearsay
evidence).
125 Id. at 364.
126 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (witness summoned to appear and testify before a grand jury
refused to answer questions that were based on evidence obtained from unlawful search
and seizure; Court held that witness must answer questions because Fourth Amendment
exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings). See supra notes 37-42 and
accompanying text.
127 R. Enterprises, 111 S.Ct. at 726 (quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343).
128 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
129 R. Enterprises, 11l S. Ct. at 727 (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 17)
(in Dionisio the Court held that compelled production of voice exemplars by a grand jury,
to be used for identification, did not violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against com-
pulsory self-incrimination). See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
130 R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. at 727.
13' Id. at 727-28.
132 Id. at 728.
133 I am puzzled at why the Court set out at the beginning of this section to define the
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quash must be denied unless the district court determines that there
is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Gov-
ernment seeks will produce information relevant to the general sub-
ject of the grand jury's investigation."' 134 The Court expressed
concern for those subpoena recipients who have no knowledge of




Justice Stevens disagreed with the reasonableness standard set
by the Court. He faulted the Court's standard for only focusing on
the relevance side of the balance while ignoring the burden a sub-
poena places on a recipient.' 3 6 According to Justice Stevens, the
moving party has the initial burden of demonstrating to the court
some valid objection to compliance.'3 7 This objection may be made
not on relevancy grounds but on various other grounds such as in-
vasion of privacy. 138 After the moving party has made this initial
showing, the trial court would then inquire into the relevance of the
subpoenaed materials. In this inquiry, "the degree of need suffi-
cient to justify denial of the motion to quash will vary to some ex-
tent with the burden of producing the requested information."'' 3 9
Applying this standard to the present case, the Respondents
fulfilled their burden of demonstrating a valid objection by arguing
the First Amendment implications involved with compliance.' 40
The trial court then should inquire into the relevancy of Respon-
dents' business records, taking into account the First Amendment
implications.1 4 ' In addition, Justice Stevens would have the district
court consider the history of this particular grand jury investiga-
tion.' 42 In the present case, the district court would, thus consider
the numerous subpoenas received by Model before the present sub-
poena. 143 Justice Stevens did not indicate how he would hold in the
reasonableness limitation imposed on grand jury subpoenas by Rule 17(c), and then,
without explanation, seemingly limited the definition to challenges on relevancy
grounds; See infra text accompanying notes 146-47 for further discussion.
134 R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. at 728.
'35 Id.
136 Id. at 730 (Stevens, J., concurring).
137 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
138 One reason for this could be the near impossibility for a recipient to adequately
prove irrelevancy at the initial objection.
139 R. Enterprises, 111 S. Ct. at 730 (Stevens J., concurring).
140 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
141 Id. at 731 (Stevens, J., concurring).
142 Id. (Stevens J., concurring).
143 Brief for Respondents, supra note 80, at 3.
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present case under this analysis. Presumably, the lower court needs
to undertake additional fact finding before a decision can be
reached.
V. ANALYSIS
In R. Enterprises, the Supreme Court expanded the Court's def-
erential treatment of the grand jury by placing on the recipient of a
subpoena duces tecum the burden of showing that the subpoena is
unreasonable. 144 In fashioning a new definition of Rule 17(c)'s "un-
reasonable or oppressive" language, the Court was unclear as to the
new standard's scope. It clearly applies to relevancy objections
under Rule 17(c), yet it is unclear whether it applies to all objections
under Rule 17(c). Additionally, support exists for the proposition
that a grand jury acts as an arm of the executive and consequently,
courts should not expand a grand jury's power. 14 5 As a result of
these considerations, this Note predicts that lower courts may look
to Justice Stevens' standard as a guide for reviewing objections to
grand jury subpoenas.
A. AMBIGUITY IN JUSTICE O'CONNOR'S OPINION
The Court was unclear as to whether its standard applies for all
objections to a grand jury subpoena duces tecum under Rule 17(c)
or is limited to relevancy objections. In setting out its reasonable-
ness standard, the Court stated that, "[t]o the extent that Rule 17(c)
imposes some reasonableness limitation on grand jury subpoenas,
however, our task is to define it."146 One then would expect the
Court to create a standard that applies generally to unreasonable
subpoenas. However, before announcing the standard, the Court
stated, ". . . we conclude that where, as here, a subpoena is chal-
lenged on relevancy grounds ..... 147 thus leaving lower courts
unsure as to whether this new standard applies to all subpoena chal-
lenges under Rule 17(c), or only to relevancy objections. This Note
therefore predicts that district courts will use Justice Stevens' stan-
dard when a burden to comply with the subpoena exists independ-
ent of the subpoena's relevance.
Additionally, Justice O'Connor's standard does not allow lower
courts to consider the unique circumstances of each case because it
requires the recipient to prove the complete irrelevancy of every
144 See supra text accompanying notes 131-35.
145 See infra text accompanying notes 150-62.
146 R. Enterprises, 11 S. Ct. at 727.
147 Id. at 728.
844 [Vol. 82
SUBPOENA REASONABLENESS
item in the subpoena. Using this standard, lower courts cannot con-
sider prosecutorial abuse of the subpoena power. To show the com-
plete irrelevancy of a subpoena a recipient must know all the
prosecution's theories. It is practically impossible for the recipient
to know every angle of the investigation and courts will not make
the Government reveal this information because that would destroy
the secrecy of the investigation. Therefore, lower courts will need
to employ a different standard when they are confronted with a valid
objection to compliance with a grand jury subpoena.
If relevancy is the only objection, courts will use Justice
O'Connor's standard due to the grand jury's exploratory nature.
When other factors are involved, courts will give less deference to
the grand jury and will want to use a standard that considers all the
implications involved. Justice Stevens' standard gives district
courts guidelines to consider all the factors. To determine if a sub-
poena is unreasonable courts should ". . . take into account the en-
tire history of this grand jury investigation, including the series of
subpoenas that have been issued to the same corporations and their
affiliates during the past several years .... ,"48
It is difficult to forecast a unified standard by which all courts
will judge the reasonableness of a grand jury subpoena duces te-
cum. R. Enterprises has made clear that district courts will no longer
place the burden on the government to make a preliminary showing
of reasonableness. This holding is correct since the burden of proof
lies on the party asserting the affirmative of a proposition. 49 In ad-
dition, a unanimous Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's analysis that
the reasonableness standard for a grand jury subpoena is the same
as the standard used for a trial subpoena.
B. HAS THE GRAND JURY'S INVESTIGATIVE ROLE CHANGED?
Critics of the grand jury system may argue that Justice
O'Connor gave too much importance to the historical investigatory
powers of the grand jury.'50 The grand jury no longer acts as a
148 Id, at 731. (Stevens. J., concurring).
149 See, e.g., Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 589 (1st Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
150 See e.g., United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23-24 (1973) (Douglas J., dissenting);
United States v. Martino, 825 F.2d 754, 760-61 (3d Cir. 1987); United States v. Smith,
687 F.2d 147, 149 (6th Cir. 1983) cert. denied 459 U.S. 1116 (1983); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings (Mills), 686 F.2d 135, 144 (3d Cir. 1982) cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 386 (1982);
United States v. Hilton, 534 F.2d 556, 565 (3d Cir. 1976) cert. denied 429 U.S. 828 (1976);
In re GrandJury Proceedings (Schofield), 486 F.2d 85, 89-90 (3d Cir. 1973); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 497 F. Supp. 979, 985 (E.D.P.A. 1980); Application of Credit Infor-
mation Corp. of New York, 457 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). For a discussion of argu-
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"guardian of the people." 15' Dissenting in Mara, Justice Douglas
criticized those who argue that the grand jury is an independent in-
vestigatory power by asserting that the prosecutor, "... can indict
anybody at any time for almost anything before any grand jury."'
152
He further contended that witnesses summoned to testify before a
grand jury are essentially brought to the prosecutor's room.
153
In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Schofield) 154, the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals described the grand jury as an investigative and
prosecutorial arm of the government's executive branch. 155 The
prosecutor yields most of the power vis a vis the grand jury. The
investigatory powers granted to the grand jury are used by the pros-
ecutor in building the case for the government. The prosecutor to-
gether with the police decides which witnesses to call. The
prosecutor examines the witnesses and by his or her actions per-
suades the grand jury what to decide. 156 It is natural that part time
grand jurors will look to the "professional" prosecutor for
guidance.' 5
7
If the grand jury acts much as the prosecutor's puppets, their
broad investigatory powers in fact are granted directly to the prose-
cutor. 158 This may be a good idea since the prosecutor is more
knowledgeable in how to run a criminal investigation. But the pros-
ecutor's power which is an extension of police power, should then
be subject to supervision and restrictions imposed by the courts. R.
Enterprises continued in the line of Supreme Court cases that still
view the grand jury in its historical independent role. Thus, the
Court still refused to recognize that they are in essence increasing
the prosecutor's powers when they protect the grand jury's broad
investigatory powers. This misconception by the Court is unfortu-
nate since the prosecutor's power should be subject to Fourth
Amendment and other supervisory restrictions.
Considering the practical changes in how the grand jury oper-
ates, the Court's standard of reasonableness places too great a bur-
den on the subpoena recipient while overemphasizing the
ments against the grand jury see, WAYNE R. LAFAvE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE, 351-52 (Student ed., 1985).
151 Mara, 410 U.S. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
152 Id. (Douglas J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 24 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
154 486 F.2d 85.
155 Id. at 90.





Government's interest. 59 The Court stressed the grand jury's in-
dependent investigative authority as a basis for showing deference.
The previous argument would seriously question placing much em-
phasis on this factor. The Court listed the government's interests as
"affording grand juries wide latitude, avoiding minitrials on periph-
eral matters, and preserving a necessary level of secrecy."' 60 The
Court admitted that a subpoenaed party that does not know the
general subject matter of the grand jury investigation will not be
able to prove the Court's standard.' 6 ' The Court was confident that
district courts would fashion a solution to this problem.'6 2 But this
standard would still be impossible to prove unless the entire inves-
tigation was explained to the recipient. Understandably courts
would never require this. Therefore, a more balanced standard is
necessary.
C. JUSTICE STEVENS' STANDARD IS MORE BALANCED
Justice Stevens' standard balances both sides' interests while
considering the grand jury's present nature. In his standard "the
degree of need sufficient to justify the denial of the motion to quash
will vary to some extent with the burden of producing the requested
information."' 163 This inquiry into the relevancy of the subpoenaed
materials would only be made after the recipient had first demon-
strated to the court some valid objection to compliance.164 Such an
objection may be that compliance has First Amendment implica-
tions. In this manner the government's interests of avoiding mini-
trials on peripheral matters and preserving a necessary level of
secrecy would be protected since an inquiry would only be made
after a recipient has already shown a valid objection. In addition,
the recipient can seek a remedy for prosecutorial misuse of the sub-
poena power. The final governmental interest of affording grand
juries wide latitude would be taken into account by the district court
when ruling on relevancy.
Unlike the Court's standard which appeared so highly deferen-
tial that a recipient would never be able to show irrelevancy, Justice
Stevens' standard would also consider the intrusiveness of the sub-
159 The Court concluded that a subpoena is reasonable unless there is "no reasonable
possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will produce information
relevant to the general subject of the grand jury's investigation." United States v. R.




163 Id. at 730. (Stevens, J., concurring).
164 Id. (Stevens, J., concurring).
1992] 847
SUPREME COURT REVIEW
poena. This is in part due to occasional prosecutorial misuse. In
applying this standard, Justice Stevens suggested that the district
court should consider the history of the specific grand jury investi-
gation including past subpoenas. While most grand jury subpoenas
will still be upheld because of deference given by the courts, this
standard will allow those subpoenas that are intrusive and irrelevant
to be quashed. This standard protects a recipient from an overzeal-
ous prosecutor. In sum, Justice Stevens' standard safeguards
against prosecutorial misuse of the grand jury system while allowing
the government to efficiently and fairly investigate possible crimes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court's decision rejecting the use of the Nixon standard
when reviewing a grand jury subpoena duces tecum expanded the
deference given to the grand jury. In reaching its decision the
Court relied on case law supporting the independent investigatory
powers of the grand jury.
The Court, in reaching a new definition of reasonableness, cor-
rectly placed the burden of proving unreasonableness on the sub-
poena recipient. By doing this, the Court rejected the practice of
circuit courts that require a preliminary showing of relevancy by the
Government. This holding agrees with the principle that the mov-
ing party bears the burden of proof.
The Court was unclear as to which objections its standard of
reasonableness should be applied. If it was only meant for rele-
vancy objections then the standard would achieve the Court's goal
of quickly setting aside frivolous claims. If the standard was meant
to apply to all objections under Rule 17(c) then it places an unfair
burden on a recipient who may have a legitimate objection to com-
pliance. Because of this ambiguity lower courts may alternate be-
tween employing the Court's standard andJustice Stevens' standard
depending upon the particular objection to compliance.
DANIEL E. CHEFITZ
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